ECTS - Democratization, Institutions and Informal Politics

Democratization, Institutions and Informal Politics (KAM622) Course Detail

Course Name Course Code Season Lecture Hours Application Hours Lab Hours Credit ECTS
Democratization, Institutions and Informal Politics KAM622 Area Elective 3 0 0 3 5
Pre-requisite Course(s)
N/A
Course Language Turkish
Course Type Elective Courses
Course Level Ph.D.
Mode of Delivery Face To Face
Learning and Teaching Strategies Lecture, Demonstration, Discussion, Question and Answer.
Course Coordinator
Course Lecturer(s)
  • Asst. Prof. Dr. Eda Bektaş
Course Assistants
Course Objectives The objective of this course is to make graduate students familiar with the influence of informal institutions during democratization process and in authoritarian regimes, and hence present an understanding about how these illicit and invisible institutions that highly shape political behavior affect political regimes.
Course Learning Outcomes The students who succeeded in this course;
  • Understand related theories and concepts on the informal institutions and politics in democratizing and authoritarian regimes.
  • Develop research projects on political behavior, processes and mechanisms in democratizing and authoritarian regimes based on institutionalist approach.
  • Get familiar with methodological tools that can be used to explain and research informal political behavior.
Course Content The role and influence of informal institutions during democratization and backsliding processes; the role of informal institutions in shaping political processes and behaviors to understand democratizing and backsliding regimes; the conceptualization and empirical analysis of informal institutions and key areas that informal institutions highly affect such as clientelism, patronage, corruption, development and institutionalization; various methodological examples that are useful to study inform

Weekly Subjects and Releated Preparation Studies

Week Subjects Preparation
1 Introduction to the course, Basic Concepts -
2 Alternative approaches to institutionalism Andrew Janos, Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science (Stanford University Press, 1986), Chapter 2, Chapters 1 & 3’ü gözden geçirin. Robert Adcock, “Interpreting Behavioralism,” in Modern Political Science: Ango-American Exchanges Since 1870, Robert Adcock, Mark Bevir, and Shannon Stimson, eds. (Princeton University Press, 2007) Gerardo Munck, “The Past and Present of Comparative Politics,” in Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, Gerardo Munck and Richard Snyder, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2007)
3 Varieties of institutionalism Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), Chapter 1 James March and Johan Olsen, “Elaborating the New Institutionalism,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, R.A. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2007) Steven Levitsky, “Institutionalization and Peronism: The Concept, the Case, and the Case for Unpacking the Concept,” Party Politics 4,1 (1998): 77-92.
4 Conceptualization of Informal Institutions Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Introduction,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006) Julia Azari and Jennifer Smith, “Unwritten rules: Informal institutions in established democracies,” Perspectives on Politics 10, 1 (2012): 37-55 Hans-Joachim Lauth, “Informal Institutions and Democracy,” Democratization 7,4 (2000): 21-50.
5 Conceptualization of Informal Institutions Alena Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business (Cornell University Press, 2006), Chapter 1 Peter Siavelis, “Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006). Anna Grzymala-Busse, “The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal Institutions in Transitional Regimes,” Studies in Comparative International Development 45 (2010): 1-23.
6 Enforcement, Compliance and Institutional Change Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), Chapters 5-7. Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo, “Variation in Institutional Strength,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 115-133 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2010) Kellee Tsai, “Adaptive Informal Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change in China,” World Politics 59, 1 (2006): 116-141
7 Midterm Exam
8 Clientelism Susan Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2013), Chapter 1 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction,” in Patrons, Clients, and Policies, Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, eds. (Cambridge University Press, 2007). Simona Piattoni, “Clientelism in Historical and Comparative Perspective,” in Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective, Simona Piattoni, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2001) Susan Stokes, “Political Clientelism,” Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, Susan Stokes and Carles Boix, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2007)
9 Clientelism Susan Stokes, “Do Informal Rules Make Democracy Work? Accounting for Accountability in Argentina,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds. (John Hopkins University Press, 2006). Leonard Wantchekon, “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin,” World Politics 55 (2003): 399-422. Javier Auyero, “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account,” Latin American Research Review 35, 3 (2000): 55-81. Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Melendez, Javier Osorio, and David Nickerson, “Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua,” American Journal of Political Science 56, 1 (2012): 202-217.
10 Corruption Daniel Treisman, “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007): 211-244. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment,” Journal of democracy 17, no. 3 (2006): 86-99 Taylor Boas, F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Marcus André Melo, “Norms versus action: Why voters fail to sanction malfeasance in Brazil,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 2 (2019): 385-400. Ana Corbacho, Daniel Gingerich, Virginia Oliveros, and Mauricio Ruiz-Vega, “Corruption as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Costa Rica,” American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 4 (2016): 1077-1092.
11 Corruption Jakob Svensson, “Eight questions about corruption,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, 3 (2005): 19-42. Daniel Kaufmann, Sanjay Pradhan, and Randi Ryterman, “New Frontiers in Diagnosing and Combatting Corruption,” World Bank PREMnotes No. 7 (October 1998). John McMillan and Pablo Zoido, “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 4 (2004): 69-92. Yuhua Wang, “Institutions and bribery in an authoritarian state,” Studies in comparative International development 49, no. 2 (2014): 217-241.
12 Authoritarian Institutions David Art, “What Do We Know about Authoritarianism After Ten Years?” Comparative Politics (2012): 351-373. Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Chapters 1 ve 2. Thomas Pepinsky, “The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism,” British Journal of Political Science, 44, no. 3 (2014): 631-653. Jennifer Ghandi and Ellen Lust Okar, “Elections under Authoritarianism,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 403-422.
13 Authoritarian Institutions Carles Boix and Milan Svolik, “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships,” The Journal of Politics 75,2 (2013): 300-316. Ellen Lust, “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East,” Journal of Democracy 20,3 (2009): 122-135. Peter Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes,” World Politics 60,1 (2007): 122-145. Henry Hale, “Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 63,4 (2011): 581-617. Joseph Wright, “Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no 2 (2008): 322-343.
14 Authoritarian Institutions Tamir Moustafa, “Law and courts in authoritarian regimes,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 10 (2014): 281-299. Scott Gehlbach and Philip Keefer, “Investment Without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies,” Journal of Comparative Economics 39,2 (2011): 123-139. Jennifer Ghandi, “Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth,” European Journal of Sociology 49,1 (2008): 3-30. Joseph Wright, “Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no 2 (2008): 322-343.
15 General Assesment -

Sources

Course Book 1. Gretchen Helmke ve Steven Levitsky, eds., Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006)
2. Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2012)
3. Herbert Kitschelt ve Steven Wilkinson, eds., Patrons, Clients, and Policies (Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Evaluation System

Requirements Number Percentage of Grade
Attendance/Participation 14 10
Laboratory - -
Application - -
Field Work - -
Special Course Internship - -
Quizzes/Studio Critics - -
Homework Assignments 2 20
Presentation - -
Project 1 40
Report - -
Seminar - -
Midterms Exams/Midterms Jury 1 30
Final Exam/Final Jury - -
Toplam 18 100
Percentage of Semester Work
Percentage of Final Work 100
Total 100

Course Category

Core Courses X
Major Area Courses
Supportive Courses
Media and Managment Skills Courses
Transferable Skill Courses

The Relation Between Course Learning Competencies and Program Qualifications

# Program Qualifications / Competencies Level of Contribution
1 2 3 4 5
1 Improving knowledge and understanding of the disciplines political science and public administration so as to enable the Ph. D. candidates to produce new knowledge on these disciplines.
2 Improving knowledge and understanding in the parallel disciplines of sociology, anthropology, history etc. to create a multi-disciplinary perspective of the field of study.
3 Introducing and improving knowledge and skills of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies and methods so as to create a capacity to utilize them in researches in the field of political science and public administration.
4 Enabling the Ph. D. candidates to utilize their thoretical, methodological, and multi-disciplinary knowledge so as to critically understand the discussions in those fields, and to understand the gaps in the literature concerned.
5 Improving academic writing skills so as to enable the Ph. D. candidates to write their dissertations or research papers in a suitable manner.

ECTS/Workload Table

Activities Number Duration (Hours) Total Workload
Course Hours (Including Exam Week: 16 x Total Hours) 15 3 45
Laboratory
Application
Special Course Internship
Field Work
Study Hours Out of Class 15 3 45
Presentation/Seminar Prepration
Project 1 20 20
Report
Homework Assignments 2 5 10
Quizzes/Studio Critics
Prepration of Midterm Exams/Midterm Jury 1 10 10
Prepration of Final Exams/Final Jury
Total Workload 130