Political Macroeconomics (POEC614) Course Detail

Course Name Course Code Season Lecture Hours Application Hours Lab Hours Credit ECTS
Political Macroeconomics POEC614 1. Semester 3 0 0 3 5
Pre-requisite Course(s)
N/A
Course Language Turkish
Course Type Compulsory Departmental Courses
Course Level Ph.D.
Mode of Delivery Face To Face
Learning and Teaching Strategies Lecture, Discussion, Question and Answer.
Course Coordinator
Course Lecturer(s)
  • Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özgür Bor
Course Assistants
Course Objectives This course analyzes selected macroeconomics topics
Course Learning Outcomes The students who succeeded in this course;
  • Economics Political situation, monetary policy, political economics of inflation, fiscal policy of politics and macroeconomics instability, and its effect on macroeconomic performance, political economics of stability poilcies, and fiscal rules.
Course Content Political economic cycle models, monetary policy, political economics of inflation, fiscal policy of politics and instability and its effect on macroeconomic policy, political economy of macroeconomic stability policies and fiscal rules.

Weekly Subjects and Releated Preparation Studies

Week Subjects Preparation
1 Introduction
2 Traditional Opportunistic Political Cycle Models. Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 15-22. Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169- 190. [Franzese, R. J. and K. L. Jusko (2006). Political-Economic Cycles. In: Weingast B. R. and D. A. Wittman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 545-564.]* [Lindbeck, A. (1976). Stabilization Policies in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians. American Economic Review, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 66, 1-19.]
3 Rational Opportunistic Political Cycle Models Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 22-44. Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. Review of Economic Studies, 55, 1-16. Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 21- 36. [Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.] [Cukierman, A. and A. Meltzer (1986). A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation Under Discretion and Asymmetric Information. Econometrica, 54, 1099-1128.]
4 Traditional and Rational Partisan Political Cycle Models Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 45-66. Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review, 71, 1467-1487. Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 651-678.
5 Political Cycle Models: General Review and Amprical Findings. Drazen, A. (2008). Political Business Cycles. In: Durlauf, S. N. and L. E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan. (The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online) Drazen, A. (2008). Political Budget Cycles. In: Durlauf, S. N. and L. E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan. (The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online) Schuknecht, L. (1996). Political Business Cycles and Fiscal Policies in Developing Countries. Kyklos, 49, 155-170. Brender, A. and A. Drazen (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1271-95. Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25, 63-77. Tekeli, R. and S. H. Akdede (2008). Yerel Yönetimlerde Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri: Türkiye’de Belediyeler Üzerine Bir Uygulama. ktisat, sletme ve Finans Dergisi, 23(262), 89- 111. Telatar, F. (2003). Political Cycles in the Parliamentary Systems: Evidence from Turkey. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 39(4), 24-39. Asutay, M. (2006). Deconstructing and Moderating the Functioning and Consequences of Political Manipulation of the Economy in Turkey. Paper presented at the 26th Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society (EPCS 2006). [Edwards, S. (1994). The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Developing Countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 42(2), 235-66.] [Franzese, R. J. and K. L. Jusko (2006). Political-Economic Cycles. In: Weingast B. R. and D. A. Wittman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 545-564.] [Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, Chapter: 4-7] [Agénor, P-R, and P. J. Montiel (2008). Development Macroeconomics. Third Edition, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 737-760.]
6 Political Economy of Inflation Kirshner, J. (2001). The Political Economy of Low Inflation. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 41-70. Sönmez, A. (2002). Türkiye'de Enflasyonun Siyasal Ekonomisi. ktisat, sletme ve Finans Dergisi, 199, Ekim, 9-30. Kibritçioglu, A. (2002). Causes of Inflation in Turkey: A Literature Survey with Special Reference to Theories of Inflation. In: Kibritçioglu, A., L. Rittenberg and F. Selçuk (eds.), Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey. Aldershot, UK, & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp.43-76.
7 Dynamic Time Inconsistency, Credibility and Central Bank Independence. Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473-492. Rogoff, K. (1985). The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-1189. Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 211-225. Özkan, F. G. (1997). Zaman Tutarsızlıgı, İnanılırlık ve Makro iktisat Politikaları. iktisat, İsletme ve Finans Dergisi, 12 (131), Subat, 23-36. [İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2004). Does Central Bank Independence Lower Inflation? Economics Letters, 84, 305-309.]
8 Politics, Instability, Populism, Myopism, Dynamics of Government Spendings and Macroeconomic Performance İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2005). Political Instability, Public Investment, and Macroeconomic Performance. Economics Bulletin, 5(2), 1-12. Roubini, N. and J. Sachs (1989). Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries. Economic Policy, 8, 99-132. Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1996). Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment. European Economic Review, 40, 1203-1228. De Haan, J., Sturm, J. E., and B. J. Sikken (1996). Government Capital Formation: Explaining the Decline. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 132(1), 55-74. İsmihan, M. (2009). The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance: Theory and Lessons from the Turkish Experience. Germany, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Chapter: 2. [İsmihan, M., Metin-Özcan K. and A. Tansel (2005) The Role of Macroeconomic Instability in Public and Private Capital accumulation and Growth: The Case of Turkey 1963-1999, Applied Economics, 37 (2), 239-251.] [Annett, A. (2001). Social Fractionalization, Political Instability, and the Size of Government. IMF Staff Papers, 48(3), 561-592.]
9 Politics, Strategic Behaviour, Borrowing, Public Investment, Corruption and Macroeconomic Performance. Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini (1990). A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt. Review of Economic Studies, 57, 403-14. 5 Persson, T. and L. Svensson (1989). Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistency Preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 325-45. İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2011). The Political Economy of Public Spending Decisions and Macroeconomic Performance. International Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), 162-74. İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2010). A Note on Public Investment, Public Debt and Macroeconomic Performance. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 15(2), 265-278. [İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2012). Public Debt and Financial Development: A Theoretical Exploration. Economics Letters, 115, 348-351.] [Tanzi, V. and H. Davoodi (1998). Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth. IMF Economic Issues, No.12, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ issues12/issue12.pdf.] [İsmihan, M. (2009). The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance: Theory and Lessons from the Turkish Experience. Germany, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Chapter: 2, 4, 5.]
10 Multi-Party system, Vote Forecast, Elections and Economic Performance: Developing Countries and Turkey Example. Akarca, A. (2011). A Prediction for the AKP’s Nationwide Vote Share in the 12 June Parliamentary Elections. İsletme İktisat ve Finans, 26(302), 53-74. Akarca, A. and A. Tansel (2006). Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results Between 1950 and 2002. Public Choice, 129, 77-105. Fair, R. C. (1978). The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President. Review of Economics and Statistics, 60, 159–173. İsmihan, M. (2012). Çok Partili Dönemde İstikrar ve Büyüme: Türkiye Örnegi, 1950-2010, Ekoform Dergisi, Mart sayısında yayımlanacak. Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. Steigmaier (2008). Economic Voting in Transitional Democracies. Journal of Public Opinion, Parties, and Elections, 18 (3), 303–323. [Önis, Z. ve F. Senses (2007). Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and a Reactive State: Major Policy Shifts in Post-War Turkish Economic Development, METU Studies in Development, 34 (2), 251-286. {Neoliberal Küresellesme ve Kalkınma: Seçme Yazılar (Derleyen ve Yayına Hazırlayan Fikret Senses) içinde, stanbul: letisim Yayınları, 2009, ss. 705-744.}] [Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. Steigmaier (2000). Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes, Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183-213] [Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. Steigmaier (2009). American Voter to Economic Voter: Origins of an Idea. Electoral Studies, 28 (4), 625–631.] [Lewis-Beck, M. S. and R. Nadeau (2011). Economic Voting Theory: Testing New Dimensions. Electoral Studies, 30, 288–294]
11 Political Economy of the Global Crisis and Macroeconomics Wray, L. R. (2009). The Rise and Fall of Money Manager Capitalism: a Minskian Approach. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33(4), 807-828. Peet, R. (2011). Contradictions of Finance Capitalism. Monthly Review, 63(7), http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/contradictions-of-finance-capitalism. Foley, D. (2010). The Political Economy of Post-Crisis Global Capitalism. Paper presented for Economy and Society Conference at the University of Chicago. http://homepage. newschool.edu/~foleyd/FoleyPolEconGlobalCap.pdf. Wren-Lewis, S. (2012). The Return of Schools of Thought in Macroeconomics. http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7656. [Özatay, F. (2011). Finansal Krizler ve Türkiye. 2. Baskı, Dogan Kitap, Bölüm: 2 ve 4.] [Walks, R. A. (2010). Bailing Out the Wealthy: Responses to the Financial Crisis, Ponzi Neoliberalism, and the City, Human Geography, 3(3), 54-84 ]
12 Delayed Adaptation, Reform and Political Economy of Stabilization policies. Veiga, F. J. (2000). Delays of Inflation Stabilizations. Economics and Politics, 12(3), 275-295. Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991). Why are Stabilizations Delayed? American Economic Review, 81(5), 1170-1188. Alesina, A., Ardagna, S. and F. Trebbi (2006). Who Adjusts and When? The Political Economy of Reforms. IMF Staff Papers, 53(Special Issue), 1-29. Perotti, R. (1996). Fiscal Consolidation in Europe: Composition Matters. American Economic Review, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 86, 105-110. [Alfaro, L. (2002). On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs. Economics and Politics, 14(2), 133-161.]
13 Financial Rules: Europa and Turkey Sönmez, S. (2011). Küresel Finansal Kriz Ortamında Maliye Politikası ve Mali kural. ktisat ve Toplum, 1(7), 18-23. Sengönül, A. ve M. Songur (2010) Türkiye'de Mali Kural: Olsaydı Ya da Olacaksa? SETA Analiz, Sayı: 29. http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/51325.pdf İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2012). Golden Rule of Public Finance: A Panacea?, Ekonomi-tek, 1(2), yayımlanacak. Drazen, A. (2002). Fiscal Rules From a Political Economy Perspective. Paper presented for Rules based fiscal policy in emerging markets Conference at the IMF/Worldbank. Feldstein, M. (2012). Europe’s Empty Fiscal Compact. http://www.project-syndicate.org /commentary/feldstein45/English. [Kopits, G. and S. Symansky (1998). Fiscal Policy Rules. IMF Occasional Paper, No:162.]
14 Animal Spirits and Economics Akerlof, G. ve R. J. Shiller (2010) Hayvansal Güdüler (Animal Spirits): îman Psikolojisi Ekonomiyi Nasıl Yönlendirir ve Küresel Kriz İçin Niçin Önemlidir. Scala Yayıncılık.
15 Identity Economics Akerlof, G. ve R. E. Kranton (2010) Identity Economics: How our Identities Shape our Work, Wages, and Well-being. Princeton University Press.
16 Paper Presentations and Final Exam

Sources

Course Book 1. Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 15-22.
2. Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169- 190.
3. Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. Review of Economic Studies, 55, 1-16.
4. [Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.]
5. Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review, 71, 1467-1487.
6. Drazen, A. (2008). Political Business Cycles. In: Durlauf, S. N. and L. E. Blume (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan. (The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online)
7. Kirshner, J. (2001). The Political Economy of Low Inflation. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 41-70.
8. Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473-492.
9. [smihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2004). Does Central Bank Independence Lower Inflation? Economics Letters, 84, 305-309.]
10. smihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2005). Political Instability, Public Investment, and Macroeconomic Performance. Economics Bulletin, 5(2), 1-12.
11. smihan, M. (2009). The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance: Theory and Lessons from the Turkish Experience. Germany, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, Chapter: 2.
12. Akarca, A. (2011). A Prediction for the AKP’s Nationwide Vote Share in the 12 June Parliamentary Elections. sletme ktisat ve Finans, 26(302), 53-74.
13. Perotti, R. (1996). Fiscal Consolidation in Europe: Composition Matters. American Economic Review, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 86, 105-110.
14. Sönmez, S. (2011). Küresel Finansal Kriz Ortamında Maliye Politikası ve Mali kural. ktisat ve Toplum, 1(7), 18-23.
Other Sources 15. Dornbusch, R. and S. Edwards (Ed.) (1991). The Macroeconomic Populism in Latin America. Chicago: The University of Chicago.
16. Drazen, A. (2000). Political Economy in Macroeconomics. N.J.: Princeton University Press.
17. Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA & London: The MIT Press.
18. Romer, D. (2011). Advanced Macroeconomics. Fourth edition, Singapore: McGraw-Hill.
19. Agénor, P-R, and P. J. Montiel (2008). Development Macroeconomics. Third Edition, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Evaluation System

Requirements Number Percentage of Grade
Attendance/Participation - -
Laboratory - -
Application - -
Field Work - -
Special Course Internship - -
Quizzes/Studio Critics - -
Homework Assignments - -
Presentation 1 30
Project 1 30
Report - -
Seminar - -
Midterms Exams/Midterms Jury - -
Final Exam/Final Jury 1 40
Toplam 3 100
Percentage of Semester Work 60
Percentage of Final Work 40
Total 100

Course Category

Core Courses X
Major Area Courses
Supportive Courses
Media and Managment Skills Courses
Transferable Skill Courses

The Relation Between Course Learning Competencies and Program Qualifications

# Program Qualifications / Competencies Level of Contribution
1 2 3 4 5
1 To compare main theories and/or approaches in political economy and make a critical evaluation of each X
2 To compare main macroeconomic theories and/or approaches and make a critical evaluation of each X
3 To use complementary approaches from other relevant disciplines (e.g. political science, sociology) in order to solve problems requiring scientific expertise X
4 To develop the skills for establishing a micro-macro link in human and social sciences X
5 To analyze the main economic indicators and comment on them X
6 To acquire theoretical knowledge through literature survey and derive empirically testable hypothesis X
7 To be able to develop new approaches/theories for complex problems in political economy X
8 To apply critical thinking, statistical/econometric tools or other relevant quantitative and qualitative tools to new areas/problems X
9 To make a research design and carry it out within predetermined time frames X
10 To formulate and present policy recommendations based on academic research X
11 To continue learning and undertake advanced research independently X

ECTS/Workload Table

Activities Number Duration (Hours) Total Workload
Course Hours (Including Exam Week: 16 x Total Hours) 16 3 48
Laboratory
Application
Special Course Internship
Field Work
Study Hours Out of Class 16 4 64
Presentation/Seminar Prepration
Project
Report
Homework Assignments
Quizzes/Studio Critics
Prepration of Midterm Exams/Midterm Jury 1 2 2
Prepration of Final Exams/Final Jury 1 3 3
Total Workload 117