1 |
Introduction |
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2 |
Traditional Opportunistic Political Cycle Models. |
Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy.
Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 15-22.
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169-
190.
[Franzese, R. J. and K. L. Jusko (2006). Political-Economic Cycles. In: Weingast B. R. and D. A.
Wittman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, New York: Oxford University
Press, pp. 545-564.]*
[Lindbeck, A. (1976). Stabilization Policies in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians.
American Economic Review, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 66, 1-19.] |
3 |
Rational Opportunistic Political Cycle Models |
Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy.
Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 22-44.
Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. Review of
Economic Studies, 55, 1-16.
Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 21-
36.
[Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics. Chur:
Harwood Academic Publishers.]
[Cukierman, A. and A. Meltzer (1986). A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation Under
Discretion and Asymmetric Information. Econometrica, 54, 1099-1128.] |
4 |
Traditional and Rational Partisan Political Cycle Models |
Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy.
Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 45-66.
Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science
Review, 71, 1467-1487.
Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 651-678. |
5 |
Political Cycle Models: General Review and Amprical Findings. |
Drazen, A. (2008). Political Business Cycles. In: Durlauf, S. N. and L. E. Blume (eds), The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan. (The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics Online)
Drazen, A. (2008). Political Budget Cycles. In: Durlauf, S. N. and L. E. Blume (eds), The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan. (The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics Online)
Schuknecht, L. (1996). Political Business Cycles and Fiscal Policies in Developing Countries.
Kyklos, 49, 155-170.
Brender, A. and A. Drazen (2005). Political budget cycles in new versus established
democracies. Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1271-95.
Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in
developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25, 63-77.
Tekeli, R. and S. H. Akdede (2008). Yerel Yönetimlerde Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri:
Türkiye’de Belediyeler Üzerine Bir Uygulama. ktisat, sletme ve Finans Dergisi, 23(262), 89-
111.
Telatar, F. (2003). Political Cycles in the Parliamentary Systems: Evidence from Turkey.
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 39(4), 24-39.
Asutay, M. (2006). Deconstructing and Moderating the Functioning and Consequences of
Political Manipulation of the Economy in Turkey. Paper presented at the 26th Annual Meeting of
the European Public Choice Society (EPCS 2006).
[Edwards, S. (1994). The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Developing
Countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 42(2), 235-66.]
[Franzese, R. J. and K. L. Jusko (2006). Political-Economic Cycles. In: Weingast B. R. and D. A.
Wittman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, New York: Oxford University
Press, pp. 545-564.]
[Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy.
Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, Chapter: 4-7]
[Agénor, P-R, and P. J. Montiel (2008). Development Macroeconomics. Third Edition, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 737-760.] |
6 |
Political Economy of Inflation |
Kirshner, J. (2001). The Political Economy of Low Inflation. Journal of Economic Surveys,
15(1), 41-70.
Sönmez, A. (2002). Türkiye'de Enflasyonun Siyasal Ekonomisi. ktisat, sletme ve Finans
Dergisi, 199, Ekim, 9-30.
Kibritçioglu, A. (2002). Causes of Inflation in Turkey: A Literature Survey with Special
Reference to Theories of Inflation. In: Kibritçioglu, A., L. Rittenberg and F. Selçuk (eds.),
Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey. Aldershot, UK, & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp.43-76. |
7 |
Dynamic Time Inconsistency, Credibility and Central Bank Independence. |
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of
Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473-492.
Rogoff, K. (1985). The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 1169-1189.
Alesina, A., N. Roubini, and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy.
Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, pp. 211-225.
Özkan, F. G. (1997). Zaman Tutarsızlıgı, İnanılırlık ve Makro iktisat Politikaları. iktisat,
İsletme ve Finans Dergisi, 12 (131), Subat, 23-36.
[İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2004). Does Central Bank Independence Lower Inflation?
Economics Letters, 84, 305-309.] |
8 |
Politics, Instability, Populism, Myopism, Dynamics of Government Spendings and Macroeconomic Performance |
İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2005). Political Instability, Public Investment, and
Macroeconomic Performance. Economics Bulletin, 5(2), 1-12.
Roubini, N. and J. Sachs (1989). Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial
Countries. Economic Policy, 8, 99-132.
Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1996). Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment.
European Economic Review, 40, 1203-1228.
De Haan, J., Sturm, J. E., and B. J. Sikken (1996). Government Capital Formation: Explaining the
Decline. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 132(1), 55-74.
İsmihan, M. (2009). The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance: Theory
and Lessons from the Turkish Experience. Germany, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller,
Chapter: 2.
[İsmihan, M., Metin-Özcan K. and A. Tansel (2005) The Role of Macroeconomic Instability in
Public and Private Capital accumulation and Growth: The Case of Turkey 1963-1999, Applied
Economics, 37 (2), 239-251.]
[Annett, A. (2001). Social Fractionalization, Political Instability, and the Size of Government.
IMF Staff Papers, 48(3), 561-592.] |
9 |
Politics, Strategic Behaviour, Borrowing, Public Investment, Corruption and Macroeconomic Performance. |
Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini (1990). A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt.
Review of Economic Studies, 57, 403-14.
5
Persson, T. and L. Svensson (1989). Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy
with Time-Inconsistency Preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 325-45.
İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2011). The Political Economy of Public Spending Decisions and
Macroeconomic Performance. International Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), 162-74.
İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2010). A Note on Public Investment, Public Debt and
Macroeconomic Performance. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 15(2), 265-278.
[İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2012). Public Debt and Financial Development: A Theoretical
Exploration. Economics Letters, 115, 348-351.]
[Tanzi, V. and H. Davoodi (1998). Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment
Hurts Growth. IMF Economic Issues, No.12, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
issues12/issue12.pdf.]
[İsmihan, M. (2009). The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance: Theory
and Lessons from the Turkish Experience. Germany, Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller,
Chapter: 2, 4, 5.] |
10 |
Multi-Party system, Vote Forecast, Elections and Economic Performance: Developing Countries and Turkey Example. |
Akarca, A. (2011). A Prediction for the AKP’s Nationwide Vote Share in the 12 June
Parliamentary Elections. İsletme İktisat ve Finans, 26(302), 53-74.
Akarca, A. and A. Tansel (2006). Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An
Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results Between 1950 and
2002. Public Choice, 129, 77-105.
Fair, R. C. (1978). The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 60, 159–173.
İsmihan, M. (2012). Çok Partili Dönemde İstikrar ve Büyüme: Türkiye Örnegi, 1950-2010,
Ekoform Dergisi, Mart sayısında yayımlanacak.
Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. Steigmaier (2008). Economic Voting in Transitional Democracies.
Journal of Public Opinion, Parties, and Elections, 18 (3), 303–323.
[Önis, Z. ve F. Senses (2007). Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and a Reactive State:
Major Policy Shifts in Post-War Turkish Economic Development, METU Studies in
Development, 34 (2), 251-286. {Neoliberal Küresellesme ve Kalkınma: Seçme Yazılar (Derleyen ve
Yayına Hazırlayan Fikret Senses) içinde, stanbul: letisim Yayınları, 2009, ss. 705-744.}]
[Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. Steigmaier (2000). Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes,
Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183-213]
[Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. Steigmaier (2009). American Voter to Economic Voter: Origins of an
Idea. Electoral Studies, 28 (4), 625–631.]
[Lewis-Beck, M. S. and R. Nadeau (2011). Economic Voting Theory: Testing New Dimensions.
Electoral Studies, 30, 288–294] |
11 |
Political Economy of the Global Crisis and Macroeconomics |
Wray, L. R. (2009). The Rise and Fall of Money Manager Capitalism: a Minskian Approach.
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33(4), 807-828.
Peet, R. (2011). Contradictions of Finance Capitalism. Monthly Review, 63(7),
http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/contradictions-of-finance-capitalism.
Foley, D. (2010). The Political Economy of Post-Crisis Global Capitalism. Paper presented for
Economy and Society Conference at the University of Chicago. http://homepage.
newschool.edu/~foleyd/FoleyPolEconGlobalCap.pdf.
Wren-Lewis, S. (2012). The Return of Schools of Thought in Macroeconomics.
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7656.
[Özatay, F. (2011). Finansal Krizler ve Türkiye. 2. Baskı, Dogan Kitap, Bölüm: 2 ve 4.]
[Walks, R. A. (2010). Bailing Out the Wealthy: Responses to the Financial Crisis, Ponzi
Neoliberalism, and the City, Human Geography, 3(3), 54-84 ] |
12 |
Delayed Adaptation, Reform and Political Economy of Stabilization policies. |
Veiga, F. J. (2000). Delays of Inflation Stabilizations. Economics and Politics, 12(3), 275-295.
Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991). Why are Stabilizations Delayed? American Economic Review,
81(5), 1170-1188.
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S. and F. Trebbi (2006). Who Adjusts and When? The Political Economy
of Reforms. IMF Staff Papers, 53(Special Issue), 1-29.
Perotti, R. (1996). Fiscal Consolidation in Europe: Composition Matters. American Economic
Review, AEA Papers and Proceedings, 86, 105-110.
[Alfaro, L. (2002). On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs. Economics
and Politics, 14(2), 133-161.] |
13 |
Financial Rules: Europa and Turkey |
Sönmez, S. (2011). Küresel Finansal Kriz Ortamında Maliye Politikası ve Mali kural. ktisat ve
Toplum, 1(7), 18-23.
Sengönül, A. ve M. Songur (2010) Türkiye'de Mali Kural: Olsaydı Ya da Olacaksa? SETA
Analiz, Sayı: 29. http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/51325.pdf
İsmihan, M. and F. G. Özkan (2012). Golden Rule of Public Finance: A Panacea?, Ekonomi-tek,
1(2), yayımlanacak.
Drazen, A. (2002). Fiscal Rules From a Political Economy Perspective. Paper presented for Rules
based fiscal policy in emerging markets Conference at the IMF/Worldbank.
Feldstein, M. (2012). Europe’s Empty Fiscal Compact. http://www.project-syndicate.org
/commentary/feldstein45/English.
[Kopits, G. and S. Symansky (1998). Fiscal Policy Rules. IMF Occasional Paper, No:162.] |
14 |
Animal Spirits and Economics |
Akerlof, G. ve R. J. Shiller (2010) Hayvansal Güdüler (Animal Spirits): îman Psikolojisi Ekonomiyi Nasıl Yönlendirir ve Küresel Kriz İçin Niçin Önemlidir. Scala Yayıncılık. |
15 |
Identity Economics |
Akerlof, G. ve R. E. Kranton (2010) Identity Economics: How our Identities Shape our Work, Wages, and Well-being. Princeton University Press. |
16 |
Paper Presentations and Final Exam |
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